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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is an appeal of the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Defendant/Respondent Northwest Power Systems, LLC ("Northwest") against Plaintiff/Appellant 
Edged In Stone, Inc. ("EIS"). The judgment dismissed ElS's claims of breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment related to a contract between EIS and Northwest to inspect, diagnose and replace the 
engine of a Skid Steer EIS owned. EIS and its president, Preston George ("George"), alleged that 
Northwest, breached its contract with ErS. EIS maintained this position despite Mr. George's 
admission that he not only requested Northwest's owner, Mark Adams' ("Adams") to examine the 
engine of EIS' s skid steer, but also authorized Mr. Adams to replace the engine. EIS further 
contended that, despite Mr. George's admissions that he and ElS did not pay a cent to Northwest 
or Mr. Adams for their service and replacement of the engine, Northwest was, somehow, unjustly 
enriched. Additionally, EIS admitted its contract with Northwest was for Northwest to inspect and 
diagnose the problem with the Skid, and EIS never disputed Northwest/Mr. Adams properly did this. 
The district court correctly concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact 
Northwest did not breach any service contract it had with EIS, as EIS, through Mr. George, by his 
own admission, authorized Northwest to replace the skid steer's engine. Further, the district court 
also correctly concluded that EIS could not prove any facts to support its unjust enrichment claim, 
as Mr. George admitted neither he nor EIS conferred any benefit to Northwest, and, moreover, 
never paid anything to Northwest for its replacement of the engine. 
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B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
On November 30, 2010, EIS filed its initial complaint, naming Caterpillar, Inc. 
("Caterpillar") and Perkins Engines, Inc. ("Perkins") as defendants. R., Vo!' I, pp. 1-81• Caterpillar 
and Perkins filed their answer on February 26, 20 II. Subsequent thereto, EIS filed, improperly, 
its first amended complaint, without seeking leave of court pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15. R., Vol. I., pp. 
49-50. The district court later granted EIS's motion to amend its complaint. ld. In its amended 
complaint, EIS added Northwest as a party, asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of 
warranty, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence and unjust 
enrichment. R., Vo!' 1., pp. 40-48. 
On November 4, 2011, a hearing was held on Northwest's Motion to Dismiss multiple counts 
of the Plaintiffs Complaint. R., Vol. I, pp.60-61. The Court granted the Motion to Dismiss Count 
II, Breach ofWalTanty, Count III, Breach of Contract, and Count IV Breach ofImplied Covenant 
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing ofEIS's first amended complaint. Thereafter, the only remaining 
claims asserted by Plaintiff against Northwest were breach of contract for the diagnosis and potential 
warranty repair and service of the Skid, breach of contract for installing an engine Northwest did 
not have permission to install, negligence and unjust enrichment. R., Vol. I., p. 63. Between 
February 15,2012 and May 23, 2012, discovery depositions of Mr. George, Mr. Adams and EIS's 
employee, Scott Webb, were taken. R., Vol. I, pp. 97-200; Vol. II, pp.201-401; Vol. III, pp. 402-
517; 619-649. 
EIS stipulated to dismiss Caterpillar and Perkins. R., Vol. I, pp. 94-96; Vol. III, pp. 574-576. 
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On July 5,2012, Northwest filed its Motion for Summary Judgment requesting dismissal of 
EIS's complaint against it. R., Vol. I, pp. 97-200; Vol. II, pp. 201-401; Vol. III, pp. 402-534. 
Northwest asserted ElS' s breach of warranty claim lacked any factual foundation, as it did not 
confer any warranty to EIS and Mr. George admitted EIS had no warranty claim. R., Vol. III, pp. 
526-27. Northwest further asserted that EIS's breach of contract claim lacked merit as its agents, 
Messrs. George and Webb authorized Northwest to replace the engine. R., Vol. III, p. 527. 
Northwest also asserted the economic loss rule barred EIS's negligence claim, and that its unjust 
enrichment claim was barred as Mr. George admitted EIS did not confer or give any benefit to 
Northwest. R., Vol. III, pp. 528-533. 
On July 20,2012, EIS filed its opposition to Northwest's summary judgment motion. EIS 
acknowledged and admitted Northwest was entitled to summary judgment on EIS's breach of 
warranty and negligence claims. R., Vol. III, p.545, 551; Tr., p.9, l.I7-p.l 0, 1.20. EIS disputed 
summary judgment as to its breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
breach of implied waITanty and unjust enrichment claims. R., Vol. III, pp. 545-552. 
On September 6, 2012, the district court issued its Order on Northwest Power 
Systems,LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment granting Northwest's motion for summary 
judgment. The district court concluded that no genuine issues of material fact existed in the record 
sufficient to allow EIS's breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims to proceed to a jury trial. 
R., Vol. III, pp. 577-578. On September 24,2012, the district court issued its Judgment for 
Dismissal, dismissing EIS's claims against Northwest. R., Vol. III, pp.604-606. The district court 
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fmiher concluded that Northwest was the prevailing party, and directed it to file its memorandum 
of costs and attomey's fees. Id. Northwest filed its memorandum of costs and attomey's fees, 
without any objection from EIS, and the district court entered its Judgment on October 9,2012, 
awarding Northwest costs and attomey's fees in the amount of$14,991.50. 
On October 26,2012, EIS filed its Notice of Appeal. R., Vol. III, pp. 611-15. EIS has not 
filed a bond on appeal. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Contract between EIS and Northwest. 
In October, 2007, EIS bought a Compact Power 500 Series Boxer 526 DX Mini Skid Loader 
("Skid") with a Perkins diesel engine from Rocky Mountain Machinery in Blackfoot, Idaho. R., Vol. 
I, p. 41. In May, 2009, Mr. Webb, an employee ofEIS, spoke with Mr. George about problems with 
the Skid. Apparently, the Skid did not idle or run conectly. R., p. 103 ( Deposition transcript of 
Scott Webb) p. 8, fl. 11 -1 9); R., Vol. I, p. 131 (Deposition transcript o.f Joseph Preston George, p. 
28, fl. ] 7-20). Thereafter, Messrs. George and Webb discussed taking the Skid to Northwest's shop 
in Boise and Mr. George authorized Mr. Webb to take the Skid to Northwest. R., Vol. I, p. 
1 04(Webb Depo. p. 9, fl. 16-22;, p. ] 0, I. 5-p. 11,1. 10 ). Thereafter, Mr. Webb spoke with Mr. 
Adams and discussed bringing the Skid to Northwest's shop in Boise. Mr. Webb took the Skid to 
Boise, using Mr. George's truck and trailer. R., Vol. 1., pp.104-1 05 (Webb Depo., p. 10, I. 9-p. ]3, 
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1.7); R., Vol. III,p.625 (Depositiontranscripto./MarkAdams,p. 22, I. 21 top. 23, 1.14).2 Mr. Webb 
told Mr. Adams that Mr. George wanted the engine fixed. Mr. Adams told Mr. Webb he needed to 
find out what was wrong first and he would let them know. R., Vol. I,pp. 104-105 (Webb Depo., 
p. 12, l. 17-p. 14, L.1); R., Vol. III, p. 625 (Adams Depo., p. 23, l. 25-p. 24, I. 6). 
After receiving approval from Messrs. George and Webb, Mr. Adams looked at the engine 
and contacted Mr. Webb, telling him the engine was dusted, it was not a warranty issue, and the 
engine had to be replaced. R.,Vol. III, pp. 625 (Adams Depo, p. 23, l.25-p. 24, 1.16; p. 37, l. 12-p. 
40, l. 3; Exhibits 1 and 2 attached thereto). Both Mr. Adams and Mr. Webb testified consistently 
about this. Both testified that Mr. Webb infonned Mr. George the engine was dusted, was not 
covered under warranty, and needed to be replaced. Mr. George, after learning this, authorized Mr. 
Adams to replace the engine. R., Vol. I, p.l 05 (Webb Depo., p. 14, I. 11- p. 16, I. 14) R., Vol. III, 
p.p.625-626 (Adams Depo., p. 24, I. 7-p. 26, t. 11). Mr. Adams also sent Mr. Webb the bid, which 
Mr. Webb presented to Mr. George, and Mr. George gave approval to fix the Skid. R., Vol. I, 
p.107(WebbDepo.,p. 22, I. 2-p. 23,1. 23). 
In its opening brief, EIS makes reference to Mr. Adams' deposition as "taken 5/23/2012, augmented 
3/15/2013." Appellate Brief, pp. 6-7. EIS's reference to Mr. Adams' deposition being "augmented" 
is confusing, as its reference suggests Mr. Adams' deposition testimony was augmented or changed. 
To the extent EIS posits that contention, it is incorrect. When Northwest filed its summary judgment 
motion, its supporting affidavits did not have a complete copy ofMr. Adams' deposition. At the 
hearing on summary judgment, Northwest's counsel provided the district court with a complete 
copy. Tr., p. 18, 1.21-p.19, 1.10. The initial clerk's record did not reflect that Northwest filed the 
entire transcript. As a result, Northwest requested augmentation of the clerk's record, to ensure the 
record reflected that the entire transcript of Mr. Adams' deposition testimony was contained in the 
record. R., Vol. III, pp.617-649. 
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Mr. George admitted, in his deposition testimony, supposedly believing, without actually 
knowing, the engine was under warranty, that he authorized replacement of the engine. R., Vol. I, 
p. 156 (George Depo., p. 129, 1l.17-22). Mr. George also admitted that he never told Northwest or 
Mr. Adams that Mr. Webb was not authorized to tell them to fix the Skid and that Mr. Webb was 
an employee working for EIS at the time Mr. Webb was dealing with Northwest and Mr. Adams. 
R., Vol. I, p. 153 (George Depo., p. 116, 1l.8 p. 117,1.2). 
Further, Mr. George testified that he was not limiting Mr. Webb's authority to have Mr. 
Adams replace the engine. R., Vol. I, p. 172C George Depo., p. 192, fl. 7-11; p. 194, ll. 3-7). Mr. 
Webb testified Mr. George never told him not to have Mr. Adams fix the Skid. Mr. Webb testified: 
Q. But when you were going through this issue with the Boxer skid 
steer, Preston [George] never said don't have them fix this, I can't 
afford to pay for it? 
A. Absolutely not. 
Q. When you talked with Mr. Adams, you understood that the Boxer 
skid steer was going to be fixed, and there was going to be a charge 
associated with it? 
A. Until he called and said that, I had no idea that that was--I thought it 
was just going to get fixed and I was going to go pick it up so the 
boys could get back to work. 1 never blind-sided Preston. 1 was 
very honest .... 1 mean, 1 was very detailed in how 1 presented 
things to Preston as far as even drawing pictures. I never blind-
sided him. Every conversation I had on the telephone with 
anything that had anything to do with that business, I either took 
notes or spoke to him while he was I the room while I was on the 
phone. Never once did I ever try to just surprise him with a bill. 
Q. And you went through that same process with Preston as it 
related to getting this Boxer skid steer fixed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And Preston [George] authorized you to say, yeah, go ahead and 
get it fixed? 
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A. I can safely say yes because I know that-I mean, it's not my 
decision. It's not my piece of equipment, so I would need some 
kind of higher-up authorization in order to make a decision like 
that. Knowing how I am personally, I wouldn't have made that 
decision on my own. I know that we had several conversations. 
And I think at one point, he thought it was bullshit that he had to 
pay for something, but it needed to be fixed because it was a 
critical piece of equipment. 
R., Vol. I, p. 106 (Webb Depo., p.18, l. 6 to p.19, l. 22 ) [Emphasis supplied]. Mr. Webb also 
testified that after he presented Mr. George with the estimate from Mr. Adams, Mr. George made 
it clear not to do anything until he gave his approval. R., Vol. I, p.ll a Webb Depo,. p. 33, fl. 5-11; 
p. 34, fl. 3-18). Mr. George gave his approval, even after knowing that the engine was not covered 
under warranty. R., Vol. I, p.110 (Webb Depo., p. 35, I. 19-p. 36, I. 21). Mr. George admitted he 
knew there was no warranty from Northwest on the engine, testifying as follows: 
Q. Would you agree that Edged in Stone and Northwest power have no 
contract that deals with a walTanty claim, in other words, Northwest 
Power was not the manufacturer of the motor; correct? 
A. I would agree. 
*** 
Q. When you bought this piece of equipment Northwest Power made no 
warranty to you whatsoever in regard to the engine? 
A. Con·ect. 
Q. Did Northwest Power ever verbally give you a warranty in regard to 
this engine? 
A. Northwest Power did not warranty the engine. 
Q. And there is nothing in writing that Northwest Power would give a 
warranty to you on this engine? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. SO in Count II of your complaint you claim that Northwest Power 
breached a warranty. What warranty did Northwest Power 
breach? 
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A. I'm not sure which warranties that it would be referring to that 
Northwest Power breached. 
Q. And we can agree that there is no written or oral warranty 
between Northwest Power and you, your warranty for the engine 
was with Cat and with Perkins. 
A. I would agree. 
Q. SO is it fair to say that there really isn't a warranty claim that 
Northwest Power breached with you? 
A. That's my opinion. 
Q. That there really isn't a warranty claim that Northwest Power 
breached, we are agreeing on that? 
A. Yes. 
R., Vol. I, p.l73 (George Depo., p. 197,1.23- p. 199, I. 10) [Emphasis supplied]. 
Mr. Webb then relayed Mr. George's approval to fix the engine to Mr. Adams. R., Vol. I, 
p. 111 (Webb Depo., p.3 7, fl. 5-7). Mr. Webb further testified that Mr. George determined that 
since Northwest had the engine, it could get it fixed quickly, Mr. George made the decision to 
approve having it fixed. R., Vol. I, p.ll1 (Webb Depo., p. 37, fl. 19-24). Mr. Webb informed Mr. 
George of the estimate and amount to repair the Skid, the initial bid of $3 ,000 to the final amount 
of$4,385, and there was no disagreement between Mr. George and Mr. Webb over the handling of 
replacing the Skid's engine. R., Vol. I, pp.l 04-112; 121 Webb Depo., p. 40, ll. 13-16; p. 42, 1.J O-p. 
43, I. 1; Exhibit 1 attached thereto). 
Mr. Adams replaced the engine, called EIS, and told them it was finished. EIS then said they 
would come get the Skid, but never did. R. Vol. III, p.627; 630-31 (Adams Depo., p. 30, ll. 10-13; 
p. 44, I. 13-p. 45, l. 9). EIS told Mr. Adams they would not pay for his work or the new engine and 
told him to take the new engine out, which Mr. Adams did. R., Vol. 1, p. 174 ( George Depo., p. 
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202.11.1-21); R., Vol III, p.630 (Adams Depo .. p. 44, l. 18-p. 45, I. 9). Mr. Adams never sold the 
engine-he sent the new engine to Perkins and kept the Skid and its old engine, telling EIS they could 
come get it, which EIS has not done. R., Vol. I, p. 172 (George Depo .. } p.1 95, I. 19-25); R., Vol. III, 
pp. 630-31 (Adams Depo .. p. 45, l. 24-p. 46, l. 8). 
2. Summary judgment. 
In its decision granting summary judgment to Northwest, the district cOUl1 cOlTectly found 
no genuine issues of material fact existed in the record on EIS' s contract or unjust enrichment claims. 
R., Vol. III, pp. 577-78. The district court found there was no genuine issue of material fact that EIS 
and Mr. George voluntarily placed Mr. Webb, their agent, in such a position that Northwest and Mr. 
Adams, who were of ordinary prudence and conversant with business usages and nature of a 
particular business, that they were justified in believing Mr. Webb was acting pursuant to existing 
authority. R., Vol. III, p. 596-598. The district cOUl1 rejected EIS's contention that Northwest and 
Mr. Adams were required to contact Mr. George directly to ascertain whether Mr. Webb had 
authority to deal with them. R., Vol. III, pp. 594-95. The district court reasoned that it had addressed 
the identical issue in another case, whether a necessary element of apparent authority was to establish 
that the party asserting apparent authority inquired with the principal about the agent's authority, and 
if no inquiry was made, the principal cannot be liable for the actions of the agent. Jd. The district 
court rejected the "inquiry rule" as being necessary to establish apparent authority, reasoning: 
While it is true that both Hausam and Podolan appear to state such a rule, 
such a rule, in the context of apparent authority is counter-intuitive to this 
Court. If the duty of a plaintiff is as described by [the adverse party] and as 
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described by J ustice[ sic] Walters in Hausam and Podolan, then a plaintiff is 
charged with a duty to inquire of the principal in those cases where the 
extemal circumstances would cause a reasonable person to believe that 
apparent authority existed, thereby creating actual authority. This cannot be 
the law. 
R., Vol. III, p. 595. The district court further reasoned: 
The Court would note that the Podolan decision, as authority for this 
statement of the law, cites to a 1926 Idaho Supreme Court decision, 
Chamberlain v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 42 Idaho 604, 247 P .12 (1926) 
(Chamberlain). Although this decision of the Idaho Supreme Court has never 
been expressly overruled, it has also never been cited by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in any of its pronouncements on apparent authority. Moreover, even in 
its more recent pronouncements on apparent authority, the Supreme Court has 
never cited to Chamberlain, Hausam, or Podolan as authority for this 
proposition of law. Therefore, this Court will reach the somewhat bold 
conclusion that Chamberlain has been implicitly overruled by subsequent 
pronouncements of the Idaho Supreme Court on apparent authority. Based 
upon this conclusion, the Court will adhere to the Idaho Supreme Court's 
more recent pronouncements on this issue as contained in Bailey and its 
progeny. See also Bales v. General Ins. Co. 0.[ America, 53 Idaho 327,_, 24 
P.2d 57,60 (1933). In this case, the Idaho Supreme Court held, contrary to the 
decisions in Chamberlain, Podolan, and Hausam, that "a person who is 
clothed with power to act for them at all is treated as clothed with authority 
to bind them as to all matters within the scope of his real or apparent 
authority, and persons dealing with him in that capacity are not bound to go 
beyond the apparent authority conferred upon him, and inquire whether in fact 
he is authorized to do a particular act. It is enough if the act is within the 
scope of his apparent authority. 2 Wood, Ins. § 408, and authorities there cited. 
R., Vol. III, p. 595. 
The district court then found that apparent authority existed, noting that: (1) Mr. George 
initially contacted Northwest to have the Skid delivered to it for diagnosis; (2) that Mr. George did 
not place any limitation on Northwest or Mr. Adams that they were to only deal with Mr. George or 
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that Mr. Webb was not authorized to be EIS' s or Mr. George's contact person or act on their behalf; 
(3) that Mr. George sent Mr. Webb from Pocatello to Boise with the Skid, entrusting Mr. Webb with 
a valuable piece of equipment ($40,000 value), to deliver the Skid to Northwest; (4) that there was 
nothing in the record to suggest Mr. Webb left Mr. Adams with a card for Mr. George, nor any 
instructions, written or oral, advising Northwest or Mr. Adams to only deal with Mr. George or his 
wife; (5) that it was undisputed that Mr. Adams contacted Mr. Webb, told him the engine was dusted 
and needed to be replaced and not covered by any warranty; (6) that it was undisputed that Mr. Webb 
advised Mr. Adams he would discuss the matter with his superior and advise Northwest how EIS 
wished to proceed; and (7) that it was undisputed that Mr. Webb did get back to Mr. Adams and 
advised him that his superior at EIS authorized replacement of the engine. R., Vol. III, pp. 596-98. 
As to EIS' s unjust enrichment claim, the district court also correctly concluded that there was 
no genuine issue of material fact EIS did not put forth facts sufficient to meet the elements of that 
claim. R., Vol. III, p. 600. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court correctly concluded there was no genuine issue of material fact 
Mr. Webb had apparent authority on behalf ofEIS and Mr. George authorizing Mr. Adams to replace 
the engine, where the undisputed record showed that Mr. George admitted he did not inform 
Northwest or Mr. Adams they could only deal with him, did not limit Mr. Webb's authority to act 
for EIS/Mr. George, and where Mr. George admitted he authorized replacement of the engine? 
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2. Is there a genuine issue of material fact whether the agreement between EIS and 
Northwest was a service agreement, capable of being performed within one year and that EIS is 
equitably estopped, barring application of the Statute of Frauds? 
3. Did EIS waive its appeal of dismissal of its unjust enrichment and breach of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, where EIS failed to raise the issue, cite to authority 
and present argument of those claims in its Opening Brief? 
4. Is Northwest entitled to attomey's fees and costs on appeal, pursuant to Idaho Code 
§§ 12-120(3), 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter oflaw. '" Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No.2, 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 
P.2d 583, 587 (1996) (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)); see also Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745, 890 P.2d 
331 (1995). In making this determination, a court should liberally construe the record in favor of the 
party opposing the motion and draw all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. 
Smith, 128 Idaho at 718,918 P.2d at 587 (citing Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 
887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994)). Based on the evidence, if reasonable persons could reach differing 
conclusions or draw conflicting inferences, summary judgment must be denied. Id. (citing Harris 
v. Department of Health and We{j'are, 123 Idaho 295, 298,847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992)). However, 
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if the evidence reveals no disputed issues ofmaterial fact, then summary judgment should be granted. 
Id., 128 Idaho at 718-719, 918 P.2d at 587-88 (citing Loomis v. City o.lHailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437, 
807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991». 
Further, when a defendant moves for summary judgment, asserting there is no genuine issue 
of material fact as to an element ofa plaintiffs case, the plaintiff"must establish the existence of an 
issue of fact regarding that element." Zimmerman v. Volkswagen o.lAmerica, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 
854, 920 P.2d 67, 70 (1996). Moreover, the non-moving party "has the burden of presenting 
sufficient evidence to establish a triable issue which arises from the facts, and a genuine issue offact 
is not created by a mere scintilla of evidence." Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho 952, 955-956, 842 P.2d 
288,291-292 eeL App. 1992) (internal citations omitted). "If the moving party fails to challenge an 
element or fails to present evidence establishing the absence of genuine issue of material fact on that 
element, the burden does not shift to the nonmoving party, and the nonmoving party is not required 
to respond with supporting evidence." Smith, supra, 128 Idaho at 719, 918 P.2d at 588 (citing 
Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530, 887 P.2d at 1038)). Further, "a nonmoving party's failure to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, on which that 
party will bear the burden of proof at trial, requires the entry of summary judgment. Jarman, supra, 
122 Idaho at 955-956,842 P.2d at 291-292. (Internal citations omitted). Thus, where the non-moving 
party fails, by way of affidavit or deposition, to make a sufficient showing to establish an essential 
element to its case, "there can be no 'genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure 
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of proof concerning an essential element ofthe nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other 
facts immaterial." Id. 
In this matter, EIS failed to meet its burden on summary judgment, as it failed to make a 
sufficient showing to establish the existence of the elements of its claims. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED EIS'S BREACH OF 
CONTRACT CLAIMS, AS THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MA TERIAL 
FACT MR. GEORGE HELD MR. \VEBB OUT AS HAVING APPARENT 
AUTHORITY TO ACT ON HIS AND EIS'S BEHALF, AND THAT MR. 
GEORGE AUTHORIZED NORTHWEST TO REPLACE THE ENGINE. 
1. The District Court correctly held EIS and Mr. George held Mr. Webb out as 
having apparent authority to authorize the work performed by Northwest. 
There is no factual dispute that EIS and Mr. George cloaked their employee and agent, Mr. 
Webb with apparent authority to authorize Mr. Adams to replace the engine. It has long been settled 
that apparent authority exists "when a principal voluntarily places an agent in such a position that a 
persoll of ordinary prudence, conversant with the business usages and the nature of the particular 
business, is justified in believing that the agent is acting pursuant to existing authority." Clark v. 
Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10, 11-12,501 P.2d 278, 279-80 (1972); Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497,708 
P.2d 900, 902 (1985) (citing, Clark, supra). Apparent authority is sufficient to bind a principal to 
a contract entered into by an agent with a third party, as long as the agent acted within the course and 
scope of authority del egated by the principal. Clark, supra, 95 Idaho, at 11-12, 501 P.2d at 279-80; 
Bailey, supra, 109 Idaho at 498, 708 P.2d at 903. There is no legitimate dispute that Mr. George held 
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Mr. Webb out to be an agent authorized to act pursuant to EIS's and Mr. George's authority, and, 
likewise, Mr. Webb had their authority to tell Mr. Adams to replace the engine. Mr. Webb followed 
George's command. 
EIS cites to Idaho Court of Appeals case law3 to support its position that apparent authority 
does not exist unless the party asserting apparent authority inquires of the principal to ascertain the 
nature of the agent's authority. While EIS cites to bothClark and Bailey, in those cases, this Court 
did not cite to Chamberlain or the alleged "inquiry rule" that the party asserting agency is required 
to inquire with the principal. This Court's precedent does not refer to any requirement that an 
inquiry has to be made with the principal. Moreover, EIS fails to cite to any Idaho Supreme Court 
case, after Chamberlain, requiring that the party asserting agency must inquire with the principal as 
to the agent's authority. A review of this Court's precedent is to the contrary. 
In Hayward v. Yost this Court did not cite to Chamberlain nor did it espouse or cite to any 
"inquiry rule." There, this Court held that declarations of an agent outside the presence of his 
principal are incompetent to prove agency, unless an agency has been established by independent 
evidence, in which case the declarations are admissible as corroborative evidence. Id., 72 Idaho 415, 
428,242 P.2d 971,979 (1952) (citing Cupples v. Stanfield, 35 Idaho 466,207 P.326 (1922). InJohn 
Scowcrofi & Sons Co. v. Roselle, 77 Idaho 142, 146,289 P.2d 612, 623 (1955), this Court cited to 
the rule that apparent authority exits where the principal places his agent in such a position that a 
Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Serv., Inc., 123 Idaho 937, 854 P.2d 280 eCt. App. 1993); Hausam v. 
Schnabl, 126 Idaho 569, 887 P.2d 1076 (Ct. App. 1995). 
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person of ordinary prudence, conversant with the business usages and the nature of the particular 
business, is justified in believing that the agent is acting pursuant to existing authority, and that the 
principal is bound by the acts of his agent acting within the scope of his apparent authority. This was 
the same rule followed by this Court in Clark, and Bailey, supra. This Court in Roselle did not 
reference Chamberlain or an "inquiry rule." Subsequent to Roselle, this Court, in Clements v. 
Jungert, 90 Idaho 143,408 P.2d 810, 814 (1965) likewise did not cite to Chamberlain or any 
requirement to inquire with the principal. There, this Court cited to the long adopted rule of apparent 
authority cited to by this Court in Roselle, Clark, and Bailey, supra. 
Similarly, in Killinger v. Jest, 91 Idaho 571,575, 428 Pold 490, 494 (1967) (citing, Hayward, 
supra) this Court, while it did cite to Chamberlain, never enunciated or followed the "inquiry rule." 
Rather, this Court there issued a holding, like the holding in Hayward, supra, as to the admissibility 
of an agent's declarations, reasoning an agent's declarations were admissible to prove an agency 
existed if the agent's statements were cOlToborated by independent evidence. Jd., 91 Idaho at 575, 
428 P.2d at 494. In Idaho Title Co. v. American States Ins. Co.,96 Idaho 465, 468,531 P.2d 227, 230 
(1975), this Court did not cite to Chamberlain, or any "inquiry rule," but held that with apparent 
authority, the party asserting agency has to use reasonable diligence to ascertain the agent's authority. 
Further, in Gissel v. Idaho, 111 Idaho 725, 728, 727 P.2d 1153, 1156 (1986) this COUl1 did not cite 
to Chamberlain or any "inquiry rule," to establish apparent authority, but cited to the apparent 
authority rule stated in Roselle, Clark, and Bailey, supra. 
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Applying the aforementioned precedent to this case, the undisputed record shows that Mr. 
George gave every indication he and EIS cloaked Mr. Webb with apparent authority. EIS and Mr. 
George did not dispute that he contacted Northwest and had Mr. Webb deliver the Skid to Northwest. 
R., Vol. I, pp.151-52 (George Depo.,p. 1J 1, I. 23-p. 112,1.20. Mr. George admitted he never told Mr. 
Adams or anyone at Northwest that Mr. Webb did not have the authority to tell them to fix the engine 
or that Mr. Webb's authority was limited to delivering or picking up the Skid. R., Vol. L, p. 172 
(George Depo., p. 192, l. 7-p. 194, l. 7). It is undisputed that Mr. George entrusted Mr. Webb to 
deliver the Skid, a valuable piece of equipment worth $40,000. R., Vol. I, p. 193. 
Moreover, ElS did not put forth any facts in the record to showing that Mr. George or Mr. 
Webb left Mr. Adams with a card or note to contact or deal only with Mr. George or his wife. 
Likewise, the record is also void of any evidence that Mr. George instructed Mr. Adams that he and 
Northwest could oi1ly deal with him or his wife. It is further undisputed that Mr. Adams called Mr. 
Webb and advised him the engine was dusted, needed to be replaced, and that it was not covered 
under wan-anty. R., Vol. III, p. 625 (Adams Depo.,p 23, 1.25-p.24, 1.16); R., Vol. III, p. 628; 642-645 
(Adams Depo., p. 37, 1.12-p. 40, 1.3; Exhibits 1 & 2 attached thereto). Furthermore, EIS did not 
dispute that Mr. Webb told Mr. Adams he would discuss the matter with Mr. George, and advise Mr. 
Adams how Mr. George/EIS wanted to proceed. R., Vol. I, p.l 05 (Webb Depo., p. 14,1. ll-p.16, 1.14); 
R., Vol. III, p. 625-26 (Adams Depo., p. 24, l.7-p. 26, 1.1l). It is also undisputed that Mr. Webb did 
get back in touch with Mr. Adams and told him Mr. George authorized replacement of the engine. 
R., Vol. I, p.105 (Webb Depo., p. 14,l.1J-p.16, 1.14). 
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The record shows, without any legitimate dispute, that Mr. George cloaked Mr. Webb with 
apparent authority. Mr. George expressly authorized Mr. Webb to deliver the Skid, never told Mr. 
Adams that Mr. Webb was not his agent, or that he was to only deal with Mr. George and not Mr. 
Webb. As a result, this Court should affirm the district court's entry of summary judgment. 
2. There is no factual dispute that when George authorized Adams to replace the 
engine, he knew the engine was not covered under warranty. 
There is no genuine issue of material fact that EIS, through its agents, Mr. George and Mr. 
Webb, requested and gave their permission to Mr. Adams to replace the engine in the Skid. EIS 
asserts Mr. George did not know until after the engine was replaced that it was not covered under 
warranty. This is entirely belied by the unequivocal testimony ofMr. Webb. Mr. Webb told Mr. 
Adams that Mr. George wanted the engine fixed. Mr. Adams told Mr. Webb he needed to find out 
what was wrong first and he would let them know. R., Vol. I, p.l 04-1 05 Webb Depo., p. 12, t. 17-p. 
14, l. 1); R., Vol. III, p.625 (Adams Depo. p. 23, I. 25-p. 24, l. 6). After receiving approval from Mr. 
George and Mr. Webb, Mr. Adams looked at the engine and contacted Mr. Webb, telling him the 
engine was dusted, it was not a warranty issue, and the engine had to be replaced. R., Vol. III, pp. 
625; 628-29; 642-45(Adams Depo .. p. 23, l.25-p. 24, 1.16; p. 37, l. I2-p. 40, I. 3; Exhibits I and 2 
attached thereto). Both Mr. Adams and Mr. Webb testified that Mr. Webb informed Mr. George the 
engine was dusted, was not covered under warranty, and needed to be replaced. Mr. George, after 
Jeaming this, authorized Mr. Adams to replace the engine. R., Vol. I, p. 105 (Webb Depo., p. 14, l. 
11- p. 16, l. 14); R., Vol III, 625 (Adams Depo., p. 24, l. 7-p. 26, I. 11). Mr. Adams also sent Mr. 
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Webb the bid, which Mr. Webb presented to Mr. George, and, thereafter, Mr. George gave approval 
to fix the Skid. R., Vol. I, p. 107 (Webb Depo., p. 22, l. 7-p. 23,l. 23). Mr. Webb testified: 
Q. But when you were going through this issue with the Boxer skid steer, 
Preston [George] never said don't have them fix this, I can't afford to 
pay for it? 
A. Absolutely not. 
Q. When you talked with Mr. Adams, you understood that the Boxer skid 
steer was going to be fixed, and there was going to be a charge 
associated with it? 
A. Until he called and said that, I had no idea that that was-I thought it 
was just going to get fixed and I was going to go pick it up so the boys 
could get back to work. I never blind-sided Preston. I was very 
honest .... 1 mean, I was very detailed in how I presented things to 
Preston as far as even drawing pictures. I never blind-sided him. 
Every conversation 1 had on the telephone with anything that had 
anything to do with that business, I either took notes or spoke to 
him while he was 1 the room while 1 was on the phone. Never once 
did 1 ever try to just surprise him with a bill. 
Q. And you went through that same process with Preston as it related to 
getting this Boxer skid steer fixed? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And Preston [George} authorized you to say, yeah, go ahead and 
get it fixed? 
A. 1 can safely say yes because I know that-I mean, it's not my decision. 
It's not my piece of equipment, so I would need some kind of higher-
up authorization in order to make a decision like that. Knowing how 
I am personally, I wouldn't have made that decision on my own. I 
know that we had several conversations. And I think at one point, he 
thought it was bullshit that he had to pay for something, but it needed 
to be fixed because it was a critical piece of equipment. 
R., Vol. I, p. 106 (Webb Depo .. , p.18, l. 6 to p.19, l. 22 ) [Emphasis supplied]. Mr. Webb further 
testified: 
Q. Right. And that's what I wanted to walk through with you briefly. So 
at some point Mr. Adams gave you a bid on what it would cost to 
get the machine fixed? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. That was all presented to Preston? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Preston gave the approval to get it fixed, either to Mr. Adams 
himself or to you? 
A. Yes. 
R., Vol. I, p. 107 (Webb Depo, p. 23, ll. 18-23) (Emphasis supplied). Mr. Webb further testified that 
after he presented Mr. George with the estimate from Mr. Adams, Mr. George made it clear not to 
do anything until he gave his approval. R., Vol. I, p. 110 Webb Depo., p. 33, ll. 5-11; p. 34, fl. 3-18). 
Mr. George gave his approval, even after knowing that the engine was not covered under warranty, 
and Mr. Webb relayed Mr. George's approval to Mr. Adams. R., Vol. I, p. 1 10-1 1 (Webb Depo., p. 
35, l.J9-p. 36, l. 21; p.37, ll. 5-7). Mr. Webb further testified that Mr. George determined that since 
Northwest had the engine, and could get it fixed quickly, Mr. George made the decision to have it 
fixed. R., Vol. I, p. III ( Webb Depo., p. 37, fl. 19-24). Mr. Webb informed Mr. George of the 
estimated amount to repair the Skid, the initial bid of$3,000 to the final amount of$4,385, and there 
was no disagreement between Mr. George and Mr. Webb over the handling or replacing the Skid's 
engine. R., Vol. I, p.1l1-I2; 121 ( Webb Depo., p. 40, ll. 13-16; p. 42, 1.10-p. 43, l. 1; Exhibit 1 
attached thereto). Mr. Adams replaced the engine, called EIS, telling them it was finished. EIS then 
said they would corne get the Skid, but never did. R., Vol. III, 627, 630 (4dams Depo., p. 30, fl. 10-
13; p. 44, l. 13-p. 45, l. 9). 
EIS contends that Mr. George did authorize replacement of the engine, but only if it was 
warrantied. R., Vol. I, p. 156 (Jeorgc Depo.,p. 129, fl. 17-19). However, Mr. George admitted that 
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at the time Mr. Adams had the Skid, Mr. George did not know if the engine was covered under 
warranty, only assumed it was, and that Northwest was to either put a new engine in or repair the 
engine when he delivered it to Northwest. R., Vol. 1., p. 174 (George Depo., p.200, ll.10-23). Mr. 
George further admitted that he never told Mr. Adams that if the engine was not covered by a 
warranty, he was not going to pay for it, and that the contract was to have Mr. Adams/Northwest fix 
or replace the engine. R., Vol. 1., p. 174 (George Depo., p. 200, I. 24-p. 7). 
EIS interjects subterfuge by contending, based on pure speculation, that Mr. Webb is open 
to a "potential" lawsuit from EIS.4 This unfounded position is irrelevant to the issues in this case, 
and is a matter between EIS and Mr. Webb. The Court should not be distracted by the simple fact 
that Mr. Webb, through George's authorization and approval, notified Adams to replace the engine. 
R., Vol. I, p. 105 (Webb Depo., ,po 14, l. JJ- p. 16, l. 14; R., Vol. I, p. 105-107; p. 110 ( Webb Depo., 
p.18, l. 6/op.19, l. 22;p. 22, l. 7-p. 23,1. 23;p. 33, fl. 5-11;p. 34, ll. 3-18; ld.,p. 35, 1.19-p. 36, l. 
21). Mr. George admitted he never told Mr. Adams or anyone at Northwest that Mr. Webb did not 
have the authority to tell them to fix the engine.R., Vol. I, p.l72( George Depo., p. 192,1.7-p. 194, I. 
7). Mr. George also admitted that he never told Adams that if the engine was not covered by any 
warranty, he would not pay for it. R., Vol. I, p. 174 (George Depo., p. 200, 1.24-p.201, L.4). 
4 
Appellate Brief, p. 13. 
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3. Alternatively, since EIS admitted the agreement was to inspect the engine, and 
did not put forth any evidence that Northwest or Mr. Adams breached that 
agreement, summary judgment must be affirmed. 
EIS admitted that the agreement between it and Northwest was to have Mr. Adams inspect 
the engine. At oral argument at the hearing on the summary judgment motion, EIS's counsel 
admitted to this: 
Mr. Henrie: We are claiming that there is a contract for the inspection of the 
machine to see ifthere was any authorized warranty repair that could be made. 
*** 
The thing is, our contract that we have asserted was a contract for labor for 
the inspection of the engine, but we never asserted that there was a contract 
for the sale of goods. [Emphasis supplied]. 
Tr., p. 32, 11.8-10; p. 33, 11. 11-14. 
EIS put forth no evidence in the record disputing that Northwest fulfilled the agreement. 
There is no genuine issue of mate rial fact disputing that Mr. Adams determined what was wrong with 
the engine, i.e. that EIS failed to properly maintain it, which caused the engine to fail, and that it was 
not covered under any warranty. EIS posited no facts to establish that Northwest or Mr. Adams 
breached the agreement by not inspecting the engine and determining what was wrong with it. 
In its Opening Brief, EIS contends it performed "daily staunch" maintenance on the engine."5 
This is belied by the record.6 There was no daily maintenance of the Skid. R., VoLl, p. 200. EIS's 
Appellate Brief, p.5. 
6 
EIS makes another unfounded contention in its brief, asserting, solely by way of its unverified 
complaint (R., Vol. I, pp.40-48), it suffered "tremendous losses." Appellate Brief, p. 7. EIS has 
not put forth any evidence to support its claim it suffered tremendous losses. Mr. George testified 
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own records show on only 6 occasions over a two year period did EIS do any maintenance with the 
Skid. R., Vol. I, pp. 145-46 (ieorge Depo.,pp. B1, 1.20-p.90, l.16). Mr. Webb testified he never did 
any mechanical maintenance of the Skid. R., Vol. 1., p. 109( Webb Depo., p.32, 1l.9-14. As to the 
outer air filter, Mr. George admitted it was never changed but only cleaned four times over a two year 
period. R., Vol. I, p. 145,200 ( George Depo., p. B7, 1l.7-10). Further, EIS did not submit any 
expert testimony in the record disputing that Mr. Adams inspected the engine and found what was 
wrong with it. There is no dispute in the record on this. Futher, the record establishes EIS did not 
examine, nor did it have any of its experts examine, the engine. Regardless, the Court should not be 
mislead by EIS's subterfuge. EIS admitted the agreement was for Northwest to inspect and diagnose 
the problem. The record is undisputed that Northwest performed the contract. Thus, Northwest was 
properly granted summary judgment. 
B. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY. 
EIS alleges that Northwest's contract is barred by the Statute of Frauds. This argument lacks 
any merit for several reasons. As the record undeniably shows, Northwest has not asselied any 
counterclaim for breach of contract against EIS. Also, as previously stated, EIS asserted a service 
agreement, for inspection and diagnoses, existed between it and Northwest. 7 It is well-settled the 
EIS's taxes showed no profit, and that it was losing money, from 2007-2009, before it bought the 
Skid. R., Vol. I, p.165 (George Depo., p. 166, 1.4-p. 1 67, 1.15). It is also noteworthy to point out that 
Mr. George's deposition was continued, as EIS had not produced all ofthe documents establishing 
its alleged damages. R., Vol. I, pp.164 (George Depo., p. 161, 1l.2-l0; p. 209, l.lB-p.2l0, l. 7). 
R., Vol. I, p. 46, ~~ 67~68. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF- PAGE 23 
Statute of Frauds applies to the sale of goods, and does not apply to service agreements, which is 
what existed here. Further, the Statute of Frauds is inapplicable, as the agreement was capable of 
being performed within a year. Finally, EIS is baned from asserting the Statute of Frauds by 
equitable estoppel, given the record is not disputed Northwest, again, performed its end of the 
agreement. 
1. The vee Statute of Frauds is inapplicable, as the agreement between Northwest 
an EIS was a service agreement. 
EIS claims Idaho's uee SOF, Idaho Code §§ 28-2-201(1) and (2) apply, yet admit that the 
contract was a service agreement, not a sale of goods. By that admission, EIS' s Statute of Fraud 
claim is barred. Again, there is no factual dispute this was a service agreement, and not an agreement 
for the sale of goods. 
It is well-settled that the UCC does not apply to service agreements. The Idaho Uniform 
Commercial Code ("UCC"), Article 2, only applies to the sale of goods, and does not apply to the 
provision of services. Idaho Code § 28-2-102 states: 
28-2-102. Scope -- Certain security and other transactions excluded from this 
chapter. Unless the context otherwise requires, this chapter applies to 
transactions in goods it does not apply to any transaction which although in 
the form of an unconditional contract to sell or present sale is intended to 
operate only as a security transaction nor does this chapter impair or repeal 
any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers or other specified classes 
of buyers. [Emphasis supplied]. 
In applying Article 2 of the UCC to a contract for services, this Court has held that when a 
contract involves a mixture of both goods and services, a court should look to see which component 
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predominates the contract. Ifthe predominant factor was goods, the UCC applies. If the predominant 
factor is services, the UCC does not apply: 
The Court of Appeals in Pittsley v. Houser, 125 Idaho 820,822,875 P.2d 232, 
234 (Ct. App. 1994), focused on the applicability of the UCC to hybrid 
transactions. The court held that the trial court must look at the predominant 
factor of the transaction to determine if the UCC applies. !d. The test for 
inclusion or exclusion is not whether they are mixed, but, granting that 
they are mixed, whether their predominant factor, their thrust, their 
purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition of service, with goods 
incidentally involved (e.g., contract with artist for painting) or is a 
transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved (e.g., installation of 
a water heater in a bathroom). This test essentially involves consideration 
of the contract in its entirety, applying the UCC to the entire contract or not 
at all. Id. (citations omitted). This Court agrees with the Court of Appeals' 
analysis and holds that the predominant factor test should be used to 
determine whether the UCC applies to transactions involving the sale of both 
goods and services. [Emphasis supplied]. 
Fox v. Mt. W Elec., 137 Idaho 703, 710, 52 P.3d 848, 855 (2002). 
There is abso lutely nothing in the record to support EIS' s position that its contract with 
Northwest was anything other than a service agreement. There is no factual basis in the record 
showing Northwest was purchasing the Skid or an engine from EIS, or that EIS was selling or buying 
the Skid or engine from Northwest. To the contrary, the contract was for Northwest's services to 
inspect, diagnose the problem and replace the engine. EIS characterized the agreement as "a 
substantial service bill .... "8 Moreover, at oral argument, EIS's counsel argued that the contract was 
a service agreement, when he stated: 
Amended Complaint, ~~ 67-68 [emphasis supplied]. 
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The thing is, our contract that we have asserted was a contract for labor for 
the inspection of the engine, but we never asserted that there was a 
contract for the sale of goods. 
*** 
There was a contract here for service, not for sale of an engine." 
Tr., p. 33, 11.11-14; p.3S, 11.14-1S [Emphasis supplied]. As a result, the Court should give no 
consideration or credence to EIS's position as to the Statute of Frauds. The agreement was a service 
agreement, barring application of the Statute of Frauds. 
2. The agreement does not come within Idaho Code § 9-905. 
Additionally, the Statute of Frauds, pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-90S, does not apply here. 
Section 9-90S provides: 
In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note 
or memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, 
or by his agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received 
without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents: 
I.An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the 
making thereof. 
2.A special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another, 
except in the cases provided for in section 9-S06, Idaho Code. 
3.An agreement made upon consideration of marriage, other than a mutual 
promise to marry. 
4.An agreement for the leasing, for a longer period than one (1) year, or for 
the sale, of real property, or of an interest therein, and such agreement, if 
made by an agent of the party sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the 
authority of the agent be in writing, subscribed by the party sought to be 
charged. 
S.A promise or commitment to lend money or to grant or extend credit in an 
original principal amount of fifty thousand dollars ($SO,OOO) or more, made 
by a person or entity engaged in the business of lending money or extending 
credit. 
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This is not a case involving a guaranty for debt, marriage, real property or an extension of credit for 
$50,000 or more. It is also not an agreement that was not to be performed within a year. Clearly, 
section 9-905 does not apply. 
3. EIS's Statute of Frauds claim is barred by equitable estoppel. 
In addition, equitable estoppel bars application ofthe Statute of Frauds, given Northwest's 
undisputed performance of the contract. Equitable estoppel applies where an agreement is complete, 
definite and certain in all its material terms, or contain provisions that are capable in themselves of 
being reduced to certainty. Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat 'i Assoc., 141 Idaho 362, 367, 109 P.3d 11 04, 
1109 (2005). Further, "[a] party who is induced to rely on an oral agreement and who changes 
position to his own detriment cannot be defrauded by [one] who interposes the Statute of Frauds to 
declare the agreement invalid." A1ikesell v. Newworld Development COlp, 122 Idaho 868, 874, 840 
P.2d 1090, 1096 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting, Roundy v. Waner, 98 Idaho 625,628-29,570 P.2d 862, 
865-66 (1977)). Here, EIS sent the Skid to Mr. Adams, told him to determine what was wrong with 
it and told him to fix it. In reliance upon EIS' s statements, Mr. Adams determined the engine was 
damaged from improper maintenance and informed EIS/Mr. Webb. EIS/Mr. George then authorized 
Mr. Adams to replace the engine, which he did. Mr. Adams then sent invoices reflecting the work 
he performed. Thus, EIS is estopped from asserting any application of the Statute of Frauds. 
Ultimately, EIS's Statute of Frauds claim is, without a doubt, specious, since it admitted to 
the existence of a contract. Again, EIS characterized the contract as "a substantial service bill .. 
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· ."9 and its counsel argued that "[t]here was a contract here fOlservice, not for sale of an engine." 
Tr., p. 35, 11.14-15. For these reasons, this Court should affirm the grant of summary judgment. 
C. EIS WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL ITS CLAIMS OF BREACH OF 
IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING AND 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
While EIS asserted, in its Notice of Appeal, issues of whether the district court erred in 
dismissing its claims of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and unjust 
enrichment 10, it did not raise them as issues, nor did it present argument or legal authority to support 
those issues in its opening brief. As a result, EIS waived those issues. 
A party waives his issues or arguments on appeal, when such are not supported by legal 
authority or the record. Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 229 P.3d 1146 (2010). See also, Kugler v. 
Drown, 119 Idaho 687, 690, 809 P.2d 1166,1169 eCt. App. 1991) ("En-or will not be presumed on 
appeal but must be affirmatively shown on the record by an appellant."), citing, Rutter v. 
McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 293, 612 P.2d 135, 136 (1980»). More specifically, as this Court stated 
in Bach: 
We will not consider an issue not "supported by argument and authority 
in the opening brief." Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524, 528, 181 P .3d 
450,454 (2008); see also Idaho App. R. 35(a)(6) (liThe argument shall contain 
the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, 
the reasons therefor, with citations to authorities, statutes and parts of the 
transcript and the record relied upon. If). Regardless of whether an issue is 
explicitly set forth in the party's brief as one of the issues on appeal, if the 
R., Vol. I, p.46 (Amended Complaint, ~~ 67-68) [Emphasis supplied]. 
10 
R., Vol. III, pp. 611-615. 
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issue is only mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent 
argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this Court. Inama v. 
Boise County ex rei. Bd. of Comm Irs , 138 Idaho 324, 330, 63 P.3d 450, 456 
(2003) (refusing to address a constitutional takings issue when the issue was 
not supported by legal authority and was only mentioned in passing). Where 
an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with particularity and 
to support his position with sufficient authority, those assignments of 
error are too indefinite to be heard by the Court. Randall v. Ganz, 96 
Idaho 785, 788, 537 P.2d 65, 68 (1975). A general attack on the findings 
and conclusions of the district court, without specific reference to 
evidentiary or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue. Michael v. 
Zehm, 74 Idaho 442, 445, 263 P.2d 990, 993 (1953). This Court will not 
search the record on appeal for error. Suitts v. Idaho Bd. of Profl 
Discipline, 138 Idaho 397, 400, 64 P.3d 323, 326 (2003). Consequently, to 
the extent that an assignment of error is not argued and supported in 
compliance with the I.A.R., it is deemed to be waived. Suitts v. Nix, 141 
Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). 
Bach, supra, 148 Idaho at 790-91, 229 P.3d at 1152-53[Bold emphasis added][Italics in original]. 
The Court in Bach then went on to hold it would not consider issues or argument submitted by the 
appellant, where the appellant's "convoluted briefing" was "lacking in coherence, citations to the 
record, citations of applicable authority, or comprehensible argument. ... " Id., supra, 148 Idaho at 
791,229 P.3d at 1153. 
In this matter, it is patently clear EIS waived its issues and argument as to whether the district 
court erred in dismissing EIS' breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and unjust 
enrichment claims. EIS did not present any argument or authority in its opening brief in support of 
its position the district court erred in dismissing those claims. As a result, this Court should affirm 
the district court's grant of summary judgment and dismissal of EIS' s claims. 
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D. NORTHWEST, NOT EIS, IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
COSTS ON APPEAL. 
Northwest is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121 
and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), should Northwest prevail 
on appeal, as it did below, since the gravamen of the lawsuit pertains to a contract for the 
purchase/sale of services and/or was a commercial transaction. Garner v. Pavey, 151 Idaho 462, 470-
473, 259 P.3d 608, 614-17 (2011). In addition, Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41 allow for the 
award of attorney's fees and costs in a civil action where a matter was defended frivolously, 
unreasonably and without foundation. Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097 
(2006). Additionally, I.A.R. 40 allows for the award of costs to the prevailing party on appeal. 
In this matter, EIS pleaded a breach of contract in its complaint, thereby invoking the 
application of section 12-120(3). However, Northwest, not EIS is entitled to attorney's fees and 
costs. There was no genuine issue of material fact EIS could not prove its breach of contract or 
unjust enrichment claims. This is supported by the fact that EIS failed to raise an issue of fact that 
it cloaked Mr. Webb with the apparent authority, without limiting that authority, to deal with 
Northwest and Mr. Adams. The records fUliher shows Mr. George admitted he did not limit Mr. 
Webb's apparent authority, and never communicated to Northwest or Mr. Adams they were to only 
deal with him, not Mr. Webb. Furthell11ore, Mr. George admitted he authorized Northwest and Mr. 
Adams to replace the engine. 
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As to EIS's Statute of Frauds claim, again, by EIS/Mr.George's own admissions, a contract 
existed between them and Northwest and Mr. Adams, as they admitted they authorized the 
replacement of the engine. They also admitted it was a service agreement, not a sale of goods, 
thereby barring their Statute of Frauds claim. 
Regarding EIS's breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and unjust 
enrichment claims, EIS waived its right to argue this on appeal by not supporting it with argument 
or citation to authority on appeal. 
Finally, as EIS admits, the gravamen of this lawsuit is a contract for the purchase or sale of 
a service and/or a commercial transaction, for which § 12-120(3) mandates the award of attomey's 
fees and costs to the prevailing party. There was a service contract here, which Northwest fully 
performed at EIS' s request. As to section 12-121 and I.A.R. 41, it is patently clear ElS has pursued 
this claim frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation, given its numerous admissions it 
authorized the replacement ofthe engine and never conferred any benefit on Northwest. Based upon 
the aforementioned statutes and rules, as well as l.A.R. 40, Northwest is entitled to an award of 
attomey's fees and costs on appeal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant/Respondent Northwest Power Systems, LLC requests that 
the Court affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Northwest, dismissing 
Plaintiff/Appellant EIS's claims, in their entirety, with prejudice. Defendant/Respondent further 
requests the Court award it its attomey's fees and costs on appeal. 
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DATED this Jl day of June, 2013. 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this I ( day of June, 2013, r served a true and COITect copy 
of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Aaron N. Thompson 
Bryan N. Henrie 
May Rammell & Thompson 
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Pocatello, ID 83204-03 70 
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